Special
Reports/Water Crisis |
Water crisis in
Pakistan
By Farrukh Sohail
Goindi
The most dreaded water scarcity
event has at last hit Pakistan. This is nothing unexpected.
The manner in which we have been used to handle our resources
and national affairs, this catastrophic occurrence was bound
to take us over. Nature’s endowment of water blessings upon
Pakistan has always been envied by the world at large. At the
time of independence 5000 cu/m of water was available for each
Pakistani, which has now reduced to 1000 cu/m because of
uncontrolled population growth.
Water is one resource that can not be generated it can only be
preserved. Farsighted nations try to conserve each every drop
of water available to them because they are aware of the fact
that if this commodity is not prudently preserved and used,
the human survival itself would be jeopardized and future wars
would be fought for its possession and control. The only
manner to conserve this resource known to man so far is to
construct dams. Dams have been built for atleast 5000 years
and, their functions have evolved with the developing needs of
the society. Most likely, the earliest dams were built to
store water for domestic and agriculture water supply. With
the onset of industrial era, hydropower became a major reason
to built dams. Presently dams are built to serve many other
functions, such as, flood control, navigation, and recreation.
According to an estimate the present volume of all storage
reservoirs with gross capacity of 5 cu/km and above amounts to
some 4900 cu/km. Out of this about 975 cu/km lie in North
America while about 1770 cu/km are in Asia with majority in
China. China has some 83000 reservoirs built for various
purposes, of which 330 are major in size. While in Pakistan we
have two major and about a dozen smaller reservoirs.
It has been said that all reservoirs are doomed to die. This
is due to loss of their storage capacity because of
sedimentation. Assuming a hundred year average life of
reservoirs (Lake Mead, USA-350 years + Tarbela, Pakistan-40
years), the world is losing about 41 cu/km of storage capacity
per year. Although we can not halt their termination yet, with
our knowledge and effort we can delay this process and
elongate their life. So far few methods are available for
prolonging the storage and life of reservoirs. Among these the
most frugal and resource preservation method is construction
of series of dams on the river so as to trap the sediment
inflows in the upstream reservoirs and store comparatively
sediment free water in the lower reservoirs. It was estimated
that Kalabagh reservoir life with Tarbela upstream and a
conjunctive operation could be extended to 100+ years. The
other operational methods include sediment sluicing alongwith
water flows through the dam outlets and flushing of
accumulated sediment through reservoir regulation methods;
though these method involve trade off between stored water and
reservoir capacity because stored water shall have to be
passed through the dam unobstructed. Another method available
is desiltation through dredging. This method is so expensive
that construction of a new storage would cost about one
twentieth of the cost of a similar reservoir.
Let us now recapitulate and make an assessment of ourselves to
find out how and why we have suddenly become a water scarcity
country from a water affluent country. Soon after the creation
of Pakistan the country was faced with a number of serious
problems including that of electricity and water shortage. The
control of three out of five Punjab rivers had gone to India,
which stopped the water supply to our canals feeding the
eastern districts of theUnited Punjab and the Bhawalpur
State.The unilateral action of the Indian Government ruined
our cultivated land which was soon rendered dry and started
becoming salinated. This affected the economy of the newly
created country very badly and the danger of famine thus
loomed over the nation. Pakistan therefore, had to mobilize
her own resources. The search for alternate arrangements to
sustain our mainly agrarian economy started. The construction
of small dams on our rivers like Warsak on Kabul and Rohtas on
Jhelum were taken up with the aid of Commonwealth countries.
In addition, for gross utilization of the available water
resources in the country, the Govt. of Pakistan set up an
organization under the title “Dams Investigation Circle”(DIC)
which was entrusted with the task of carrying out
comprehensive survey for collecting the data and preparing the
projects which may help in resolving the problems of water and
energy shortage. By the end of May 1996, the DIC prepared a
number of projects, which included Dams at Kalabagh on Indus
River and Rohtas (later called Mangla) on Jhelum river.
Investigations for construction of a huge multipurpose dam on
Indus River at Kalabagh were started in 1953 and its
feasibility was submitted to the Govt. after getting approved
by a group of expert foreign Consultants. The Govt. approved
this in 1959, the year WAPDA came in to being. In 1960 a
treaty between Pakistan and India was signed with World Bank
mediation widely known as the “Indus Basin Treaty”. According
to this treaty, control of waters of Ravi, Bias and Sutlej was
given to India with the condition that the Indian Govt. will
compensate for the loss of Pakistan and fully participate in
the construction of the replacement works with the help of the
World Bank and the other aid giving agencies. The replacement
works included two large dams one on the Indus and the other
on Jhelum, five barrages and eight link canals and a siphon
for carrying the waters of Chenab River across the Sutlej
River. The then Chief Martial Law Administrator and President
Ayub Khan on behalf of the Pakistan Govt. and the Indian Prime
Minister Pandit Jwaharlal Nehru on behalf of India signed the
treaty; Eugene Blake signed the treaty on behalf of the World
Bank. For the two large multipurpose dams on Indus and Jehlum
Pakistan proposed sites at Kalabagh and Rohtas (later called
Mangla). Kalabagh site choice for Pakistan was obvious since
lot of investigation had been carried out at this site and a
feasibility report duly prepared and approved by the GOP after
check and scrutiny by the foreign experts and consultants.
In the meanwhile a group of shortsighted bureaucrats gathered
around Ayub Khan and convinced him to switch over the
construction site on Indus River from Kalabagh to Tarbela some
100 miles upstream. Unfortunately, Ayub Khan was neither a
political leader nor had the wisdom to understand the
implications of the counsel given to him. In fact it was some
sort of intrigue weaved very carefully around Ayub Khan by
some petty minded bureaucrats who had their own axe to grind
rather than serve the national interest. On Ayub Khan’s
insistence the design of dam at Tarbela site was prepared in
great hurry, which was not based on detailed site
investigations and thus had many inherent defects. The team of
experts warned the GOP that this project would be a complete
failure and the whole investment on this scheme will go down
the drain. Incidentally no attention was paid to this warning.
Ayub Khan soon came to know that the World Bank would not pay
a single penny for this badly designed project of Tarbela Dam.
Since, a large dam was part of the treaty, the GOP commenced
work on Tarbela Dam out of the funds received for Kalabagh Dam
and later approached other countries, who agreed to finance
the project on terms and conditions favored to their
interests. The reasons for switching over to Tarbela Dam were
never made known to the public which ofcource was not in a
position of raising any voice against the authority of the
Martial Law Government. Kalabagh Dam was therefore thrown into
the dustbin and all the resources were diverted towards
Tarbela Dam. However, a lollypop was given to the nation
stating that since it is intended to built a series of dams on
the Indus river, soon after completion of Tarbela all
machinery and trained man-power would be diverted towards
construction of Kalabagh and later on completion of Kalabagh,
these resources would be utilized for construction of
dam(s)upstream of Tarbela at suitable sites.
Tarbela’s hurried and faulty design brought Pakistan near
total catastrophe in 1974. It was only the Almighty that saved
Pakistan from complete devastation. An accidental stuck-up of
tunnel gates at Tarbela forced the operating authorities dump
the full reservoir and when the reservoir was completely
depleted it was found that large sink holes have developed on
the immediate upstream of the dam. This is a phenomenon akin
to silent heart attack, which results into sudden cardiac
arrest without warning. With a newly full reservoir no one
could visualize such a happening and one fine morning there
would have been no dam resulting into the whole country being
under 4-6 feet of water.
The story of Kalabagh does not end here. During Bhutto era
need for another storage seriously cropped up and research and
studies with the help of both local and foreign consultants
were carried out to develop the Kalabagh feasibility studies
into full fledge project design. This design was deliberated
by top world experts on dam design, reservoir sedimentation
and operation. Due care was given to various implications
involved and engineering solutions based on sophisticated
techniques were chalked out. During Zia regime the World Bank
committed some U.S. $7.0 billion and kept this amount
earmarked for about three years. Then suddenly an intrigue
based on dirty politics sealed the fate of the Kalabagh Dam
for all times to come. A powerful General who was Governor of
NWFP in order to put pressure on Zia for reasons best known to
them, in connivance with some Consultants started marking high
flood level marks on the houses, graveyards, mosques and other
permanent structures, and set a wave of alarm among the public
of fear of their drowning. This disturbance among the people
was played up so much that a strong resistance started
developing among the inhabitants of NWFP against the Dam. Most
unfortunately, these high flood level marks were neither based
on facts nor had any basis. The dam designers in particular
and the engineering community in general based on actual
studies proved and showed that even in the worst scenario when
both Tarbela and Kalabagh are full and an unprecedented
historic flash flood occurs, the high flood level would not
reach to a stage so as to cause any damage to the populace.
With regard to the fear of waterlogging in the Nowshera valley
adequate provision was made for tubewell installations as part
of the Kalabagh project. But, the shot had been fired and
before the NWFP people fears could be quelled, the Sindh
Province came out with an entirely opposite objection to the
Kalabagh Dam building i.e. drought and water scarcity. The
controversy has reached to an extent that today almost every
one in Pakistan has formed opinion either for or against the
Kalabagh Dam.
If we look deep into the controversy we would clearly see the
mistrust and distrust between the Provinces being an outcome
of the suppression caused by autocratic rules and absence of
democratic forces needed to freely vent and mitigate the
negative forces.
Coming back to the water scarcity problem, we find that
absence of additional storages have forced us to burden
Tarbela most adversely by inflicting continued low level
drawdowns which caused racing of large sediment deposits
within the reservoir towards the Dam much before than
expected. To retard the movement of sediment towards the Dam
it was required to keep the minimum pool level higher so as to
keep the delta away from the Dam and maintain the reservoir’s
live storage as much as possible. For example, Tarbela minimum
pool level initially was fixed at El. 1300 and later with the
increase in sediment inflows was to be gradually raised to El.
1400 and if need arises even higher. But, successive dry years
forced us to operate the reservoir at lower levels and as a
result the toe of the delta has almost reached upto to mouth
of the intakes. As such, this year we are forced to stop water
releases from the reservoir at El. 1369 and, if we venture to
lower it further all silt, sand and debris would pass through
the power intakes and damage the turbines to an extent that
the power house shall have to be closed for repairs involving
heavy amount of foreign exchange.
The Kalabagh controversy started some 15 years back and during
this period we did nothing but to concentrate on rhetoric for
or against Kalabagh. Although it was known that consensus on
construction of a new reservoir above or below Kalabagh will
take some time and when it somehow gets finalized then
preparation of its feasibility, design and then construction
all would involve not less than 15 years. One preference for
Kalabagh is that its designs are prepared and even the tender
documents are ready.
It is a well-known fact that in the world most lucrative
projects were conceived but resisted and washed out by
envoirmentalists. That never was construed as end of the day.
Planners always have alternate plans ready, which
unfortunately we miserably lack. Prudence demanded that during
the last 15 years we should have worked on sites other than
Kalabagh and reached a level from where the actual
construction commences. Not only that, we should have educated
ourselves through research and study of Tarbela reservoir
sedimentation processes and upgraded our knowledge of the
complexity of reservoir sedimentation.
The engineering interest in reservoir sedimentation concerns
three physical aspects; (i) overall volume of trapped
sediment, (ii) distribution of deposit volume, and (iii)
distribution of sediment particle size within the reservoir.
The loss of storage capacity due to sediment deposits reduces
the efficacy of a reservoir to regulate the flow and to
provide a flood control. The distribution of volume of deposit
determines the relative impact of trapped sediment on the
usable storage, and the distribution of particle size effects
the density of deposits as well as the potential damage caused
by the ingress of sediment into the power inlets.
A number of approaches have been developed in the world to
study these phenomenon. These include empirical methods;
mathematical modeling and physical modeling but all these
approaches have their limitations and need research and study
to evaluate their effectiveness. Tarbela reservoir is one such
place where ideal conditions exist to enhance our knowledge in
area of sedimentation engineering.
WAPDA was established to develop the water and power resources
of the country. It was structured as a multi-disciplinary
organization with wide autonomy of working. It was at its
Zenith when it most successfully and in record time completed
world’s gigantic Indus Basin Project. Although, after the
Indus Basin Project no new large construction project with the
exception of SCARP was handled by WAPDA yet, it continued its
effective and productive role of water development through
research and studies. Between 1974 to1987 under its aegis
world’s largest ever undertaken prototype research in the
mechanics of alluvial channels using the canals and rivers of
Pakistan was undertaken with the collaborative sponsorship and
funding from the National Science Foundation of USA. The
accomplishments under this research endeavor provided
worldwide designers of the alluvial channels new approaches
based on phenomenon hither to unknown and unobserved. Later,
the WAPDA organization entrusted with this research project
was elevated into an international sedimentation research
institute in order to use its knowledge and expertise to
research and study the complex processes of sedimentation, the
biggest menace and threat to the water resources whether these
are flowing or conserved.
Then a gradual apathy, unconcern and indifference on WAPDA’s
part towards its basic objective of development of water and
power resources tookover; most probably due to the attitude of
its higher-ups who considered WAPDA’s role solely of a revenue
collection agency. Unfortunately, those under the top brass
were also insensitive towards the sophisticated expertise
developed within the organization and therefore did not have
the capability of properly guiding or counseling the
decision-makers. The net result was that organizations that
were built in decades were destroyed and reduced to shambles
in months. The star international sedimentation research
institute is now dumped into few katcha garages in a remote
corner of the city. All its sophisticated equipment has either
been reduced to junk or pilfered and all the expertise gained
totally lost. This world renowned research institute is now
headed by a Sr. Engr. who has been promoted from a mechanical
overseer. Similarly, another organization, which was developed
from Dams Investigation Circle (mentioned earlier), is under
so much fear and harassment that its employees have
practically lost all nerve. This organization is also being
headed by a mechanical engineer who does not know even basics
of dam engineering.
Various periodic inspections of Tarbela Dam by experts
recommended different solutions to tackle the sedimentation
problems of the reservoir. For testing and researching these
solutions it was proposed that immediately a physical model
studies laboratory be established at Tarbela site. This
laboratory would not only undertake a comprehensive research
and study to find solutions to Tarbela problems but also cater
for future needs of other projects on the Indus River and its
tributaries. In this regard collaborative efforts were made
with a prestigious Chinese sedimentation research institute.
But, with the departure of those who were instrumental in
developing of this collaborative activity with the Chinese,
every thing was thrown to airs. The Chinese are constructing a
very large dam namely “Three Gorges Project”. This project is
not only being researched in a physical-modeling laboratory at
the site but at every major engineering university in the
country. What a pity? We who claim to have world’s most
integrated water resource and conveyance system do not have
even one laboratory in the country capable of studying dams,
reservoirs or sedimentation problems. On the other hand, as
announced by the Chief Executive, we are planning to construct
a number of reservoirs and, unfortunately, do not posses the
basic infrastructure to study the complexities involved. The
one laboratory at Nandipure under the Punjab Irrigation
Department is not even sufficient to handle Punjab
Irrigation’s own problems and the efficacy and efficiency of
this laboratory portrays the same story of apathy.
WAPDA has now come up with its dream of “vision 2025”. With
the present level of in-house knowledge and expertise can it
even initiate such a utopic program? We talk of constructing
projects like Bhasha Dam. Unfortunately, we think of Bhasha
probably similar to a plaza. This project is going to be far
more problematic than Tarbela (Refer Panel of Experts
Report-1988). No local firm (s) is capable of undertaking its
investigations without active collaboration of foreign
experts/specialists. Had we continued the research and study
efforts started way back within WAPDA, we by now would have
achieved a level of knowledge whereby our dependency on
foreign expertise had been minimal. But, we wasted all
opportunities and chances. No we can do nothing but hold
Namaz- e- Istasqa.
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